Tu trzeba trochę subtelności.

 Tu trzeba trochę subtelności. Tak jak wojnę nie koniecznie zaczyna ten, kto pierwszy podejmuje działania militarne, np obecna sytuacja na Ukrainie, tak samo zwycięstwo militarne nie jest synonimem zwycięstwa politycznego, tak naprawdę wygrywa wojnę ten, kto zdobywa więcej władzy, bądź przynajmniej umacnia i stabilizuje władzę którą już posiada. W tym sensie największym wygranym drugiej wojny było światowe żydostwo. Możemy, na niższym poziomie mówić o zwycięstwie USA, ale jak widać obecnie na nie wiele się to zdało.

Military thought is simply not political thought. The permanent ambition of all military thought is to win a military victory; the corresponding ambition of all political thought is to win more power (…)..

The Polish officials of 1939 were politically stupid in the first sense.
Their country encircled by two Great Powers that had just concluded a non-aggression pact, they nonetheless chose to enter upon a war that would mean for it direct, permanent political extinction in the least desirable form: occupation and partition. Actually, it is pure charity to call the political dealings of those officials stupidity instead of treason, for shortly after the beginning of the War, they disappeared, going abroad to live on the capital they were able to amass owing to their policy.

Treason and political stupidity are closely related to each other. In The Proclamation o f London it is stated: “Treason is nothing but incapacity when it becomes resolute.” As used here, the word “treason” refers to treasonous conduct on the part of individuals. An individual may be able to better his personal-economic circumstances through an act of treason, 14 but no group, no class, no organic stratum within a country is ever able to better the power-position of the country through a large-scale act of treason.

In this sense, all treason is political stupidity.

The English officials of 1939 were politically stupid in the second sense in that they completely failed to identify the larger power-currents and likewise totally lacked statesmanlike feeling for the Definition of Enemy: The Enemy is the state that one can defeat and thereby gain more power. * Thus military victory over an opponent whose defeat proves so costly that one must take in the bargain a greater loss of power elsewhere must be called political defeat.

These English officials approached diplomatic preparations for the Second World War according to the old tried and true methods. They attempted to isolate Germany, concluding wherever possible war-alliances with Germany’s neighbours (the “Peace Front”). They counted on American aid, trusting in the Washington regime’s assurances that it would be able to lead America to war-despite the geopolitical position of America, despite the unanimous opposition of the American people, despite the conflict between intervention and the national interests of America, and finally, despite the fundamental spiritual indifference of Americans towards even a victorious war against Europe.

The question they failed to ask was: What is the final political aim? Or in other words: How will England’s power be increased through a victorious American war against Germany? Had they asked this question, it would have been obvious to them that, since England could not win this war alone, any extension of power derived from a defeat of Germany would be for the benefit of America, or some other power. The result of their failure to ask this question was England’s total defeat.

The suicide-policy of the English regime in 1939-it was continued throughout the War-has various roots, and the ultimate explanation of it will keep scholars and archivists busy. The essential facts are already well-known.

First, political stupidity alone is not to blame: Some members of the government consciously and deliberately pursued a policy that was not pro-English, only anti-German. Second, some members of this regime were not officially part of the government, indeed, not even part of the English organism. Third, and most importantly, with Joseph Chamberlain the rich political tradition of England had been laid to rest. The succeeding statesmen were of lesser calibre; class-warriors, like Lloyd George and MacDonald; pure egotists, capable of representing any alien interest, like Churchill and Eden; even obsessed psychopaths, like Duff Cooper.

https://varapanno.blogspot.com/2022/12/it-is-pure-charity-to-call-political.html?m=1